cultural diversity as a fundamental right for political communities has been debated at UNESCO for several years.
Second, and related to transnational developments, we are witnessing increasing legitimacy att ached to "thin" conceptions of liberal citizenship, or of postnational citizenship within liberal democracies, that value civic membership above particular "prepolitical" ethnic markers of belonging, and individual rights-based polities over collective social projects based on comprehensive liberal doctrines. According to Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (2003) , there seems to be a convergence among liberal democracies towards sociological multiculturalism as fact, and eff orts at political integration based on the twin pillars of a common public language and individual rights as responses by state actors. Diversity in this sense has come to be associated with models of citizenship that acknowledge cultural pluralism within states, allowing for citizenship to be defi ned through particular cultural att achments as opposed to top-down defi nitions of citizenship that refl ect homogeneous majority cultures as a precondition for belonging.
SELF-UNDERSTANDING, REPRESENTATION, AND SOVEREIGNTY
The Canadian case lies at the crossroads of these two developments. Canada faces diversity on both fronts. In many ways Canada must navigate through questions surrounding a plurality of nation-based forms of representation and sovereignty, while simultaneously addressing issues related to self-understanding, belonging, and more generally, citizenship, in a sett ing characterized by diverse social and cultural identities. Since Canada is a multinational democracy, debate surrounding diversity tends to stop short at sorting out the various layers of diversity-national, ethnocultural, social-without actually taking a step further to fi nd solutions for the management of diversity. Will Kymlicka (1995 and has done pioneering work in this area, looking at the challenges that diversity poses for liberal citizenship. He contends that the "bundle of rights" for ethnocultural communities cannot be the same as those considered for national minorities. The former seek inclusion within a larger political community, or equalized conditions for integration, while the latt er seek self-government rights that, in many respects, constitute a rejection of citizenship as defi ned at the level of the "multination."
In Canada the distinct layers of diversity are oft en pitt ed against one another, and political projects or solutions made in their names are employed to undermine other legitimate expressions of diversity. On the one hand, Canada must manage the question of "national" diversity, a challenge that several liberal nationstates, such as Australia, Germany, and the Republic of Ireland, do not have to grapple with to the same extent. On the other hand, Canada is also involved in craft ing the boundaries of citizenship and must address questions related to the integration of immigrants, cultural pluralism, and ethnocultural diversity while respecting its federal constitution. This is the fundamental challenge confronting the country today, and any att empt to sort through the issue of diversity must account for this entanglement.
Conceptually, the question of diversity itself must be disaggregated to refl ect distinct political and social projects. Methodologically, a multinational democracy such as Canada is precisely the case with which to evaluate such projects, since the term diversity means diff erent things to diff erent social and political interlocutors.
Postnationalists argue that the nation no longer defi nes the political subject as constitutive of a collective project. Even assuming that that is the case, what defi nes the boundaries of the political community, territorial conceptions of sovereignty and representation if not, at the very least, remnants of the nation form? In a sense postnationalists have become proponents of political stability more than advocates of justice (see Helen Irving's chapter in this volume), whereas several well-grounded political philosophers argue that justice is a guarantor of political stability. Regardless of the extent to which national identity is decoupled from citizenship, it still structures our cognitive understanding of politics, particularly in relation to territorial modes of representation, deliberation, and policy outcomes. This is the crux of the dilemma for most liberal-democratic nation states. The overwhelming response has been to recreate the nation away from exclusive pre-political markers towards inclusive rights-based conceptions that recognize few collective att ributes of membership other than instrumental ones, such as a common language or respect for the basic laws of the state.
In more recent years nationalism has also gained legitimacy as a complement to liberalism, with some observers highlighting its capacity to provide the solidarity and cohesion necessary for liberal values to take hold in any society. For example, Jeff rey Spinner (1994) notes that liberalism enhances the importance of language as a marker of identity. The liberal ideal of equal opportunity could not be realized in Quebec, for example, unless language was institutionalized. By reducing the salience of ascriptive "ethnic" markers of identity, liberalism may increase the likelihood that people att ach themselves to national identities. For Spinner (1994, 157) nationalism is compatible with liberalism if two conditions are met: fi rst, the nationalist movement should mobilize around a speech community that is large enough to support the institutions of an industrial society; and, second, the movement should be willing to construct a liberal, pluralistic public space.
Conclusions commonly referring to postnational developments may be pointing to developments in liberal thought and practice that do not undermine the existence of the nation altogether but, rather, reinforce its relevance. Indeed, though diversity involves the acknowledgement of diff erence as a defi ning aspect of a particular political community, according to Yael Tamir (1993) , all liberal nations are nevertheless "entitled to a public sphere in which they constitute a majority." The very logic of liberalism, by soft ening the edges of "thick" nationalism, is thus deemed by some to refl ect a "new" phenomenon of postnationalism. It may be argued, then, that substantive culture as the essence of the nation has largely been replaced by the procedural culture of liberalism itself. In the end advanced democratic states are simply reverting to liberal solutions, throwing rights at the issue of diversity and widening the private sphere. Even Jürgen Habermas, the recognized champion of postnational thought, has conceded that his preferred notion of "constitutional patriotism" is not devoid of certain collective att ributes that precede process and form. In Habermas's view, public spaces demarcated by rational social communication and devoid of "thick" sociocultural markers of citizenship nevertheless require a common language and some consensus with regard to the parameters of the common political culture. In essence, the term "postnational" itself causes some confusion, to the extent that it implies a state of aff airs that has moved beyond monistic conceptions of belonging, even though Habermas himself, in refashioning belonging based on a procedural patriotism, assumes that there is a political community in which such consensus and deliberation takes place. For Habermas the exercise of sovereignty defi nes the parameters of citizenship, as opposed to stemming from "pre-political" ethnic identities. This does not imply, however, that political communities can be constructed anywhere and at any time so long as a procedural constitution is in place. Habermas's main contribution to redefi nitions of the nation is indeed the very notion that citizens converge around a constitution, which is deemed as somewhat of a victory, in the sense that there is widespread consensus as to the legitimacy of the basic laws governing a political community. For Habermas it is the process of "citizenization" itself that leads to such ends (see Dufour 2001, 157-210) .
In the Canadian case this consensus is absent and the process of deliberation is stunted, due to central nation-building eff orts that undermine the fl ourishing of one political community in order to construct a larger procedural basis for citizenship. The present Constitution of 1982 is simply instrumental and a large proportion of Quebecers appear to consider it a nuisance. Debates on the merits of diversity in Quebec have proceeded in conjunction with those in the rest of Canada, but the model of social and political integration itself must, by defi nition, recognize the primacy of a national centre for convergence.
Quebec is a postnational province to the extent that its version of national belonging allows room, in principle, for a plurality of identities and individual rights (see Gagnon and Iacovino 2004) . However, it does not have the luxury of adhering to a radically postnational model that disregards all collective initiatives and a modest conception of comprehensive liberalism, because its raison d'être, as a distinct political community within the Canadian federal arrangement, stems, as in other cases where the demarcations of national identity are being reformulated, from "pre-political" sociocultural markers, such as language, memory, history, and shared institutions. Quebec national identity is recognized as a collective good by most of the people living in the province (see table 4.1) and as such, may well constitute an object of policy for as long as Quebec does not have its own fully developed constitution, and for as long as a Canadian constitution that has received Quebec's endorsement is not formalized and entrenched. In this sense what is also absent from Habermas's contribution is a sensitivity to social and political forces that provide the context for particular constitutional trajectories, Source: Wells (1998).
which vary from one state to another in distinct historical sett ings. Notions of consent, mutual recognition, and, to a lesser extent, continuity, which form the bases of just constitutionalism, are largely ignored (see Tully 1995) . Moreover, in a multinational context universal approaches that dilute sociocultural att achments in the management of diversity actually work against minority nations and, paradoxically, undermine diversity, to the extent that national diversity is not acknowledged as constitutive of the country and, more specifi cally, as constitutive of citizenship status. They cannot be considered separate issues, as the actions aimed at one set of problems invariably touch the other. If postnationalism can be equated with the logic of universal liberalism itself, in which citizenship is defi ned by fundamental rights based on a universal conception of personhood, then this serves, it may be argued, the political purposes of the central Canadian state, since it tends to obfuscate the perception of a plurality of distinct host societies or societal cultures (a term att ributed to Kymlicka). For those who view cultural diversity as a Canada-wide area of management, Quebec's appeal for "national" recognition is antithetical. A model of cultural pluralism, such as Canada's policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, does not specifi cally recognize national belonging as a basis for citizenship, at least in its sociocultural expressions. Nonetheless, "universal" models of membership in a multinational context oft en exhibit strong majority nationalist pressures on the defi nition of the larger political community, in the sense that the will of the majority is refl ected in public policy outcomes (see Gagnon 2003) . For many Quebecers, on the other hand, certain aspects of "pre-political" nationalism cannot be divorced from their sociopolitical project because of the particular status of the province as a minority nation or societal culture within Canada.
WHAT IS THE PLACE MADE FOR QUEBEC DIVERSITY IN THE DEBATE OVER IDENTITY IN CANADA?
With regard to cultural pluralism, Canada has entrenched offi cial multiculturalism in its Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This approach has endured over many years, and in order to trace back the debates around which this vision was adopted it is necessary to review the impact of former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, acknowledged by many to be the principal architect of this approach to diversity in Canada.
Trudeau rejected the nation-state model, although he defended Canadian sovereignty against any U.S. encroachments, valuing the foundations of the modern state as based on universalizing and individualist liberalism. He thus contrasted the "sociological nation," which he associated with reactionary and emotive politics, to the "juridical nation," which he linked with universalism and reason. For Trudeau national identity was an outdated form of loyalty, driven by narrow interests and impeding the progress of civilization. Quebec's neonationalism was thus deemed to constitute a threat to progressive politics, being, in his view, certain to lead to a cycle of never-ending confl icts that would hinder reconciliation and unity. For Trudeau a federal state was most conducive to the development of the juridical nation and the exercise of reason in politics (see Karmis 2004 ). These pillars of Trudeau's thought culminated, in the end, in the formal construction of a pan-Canadian nationalism based on multiculturalism, institutional bilingualism at the federal level, and, above all, the primacy of individual rights and freedoms. Although culture is recognized, through the formal entrenchment of multiculturalism, as fundamental to each individual's autonomy and equality, and constitutive of his or her rights and freedoms, the vision sought by Trudeau and his colleagues did not encourage any particular collective status based on historical, cultural, or territorial claims as defi ning political markers of att achment to Canada.
Constitutional developments, up to and including the Clarity Act of June 2000, show how this vision of Canada has endured. Since 1982 this vision has left a mark on Canada's self-understanding which makes it extremely diffi cult to allow for other "formal" approaches to the management of diversity, particularly with regard to some form of constitutional formula that might disaggregate the countervailing ten-dencies of acknowledging sociocultural diversity simultaneously with national diversity. Also, the Canadian approach to the management of diversity, although pluralist and postnational in rhetoric, paradoxically undermines the substantive aspirations of distinct societal cultures by interpreting (in our view, misinterpreting) the meaning of "equal status" to link it with homogeneous and universal legal provisions.
Through the central institution of citizenship Canada has carved out the national boundaries of the country from coast to coast, based on a rights regime that has not undergone the process of acceptance and consensus that even a proceduralist such as Habermas deems necessary for any legitimate political community. This situation has contributed to undermining the context of choice for Aboriginal nations and Quebecers within current federal arrangements. In other words, federalism as a political tool for the management of diversity in a multinational democracy must, we would argue, account for qualitative diff erences in citizenship, leading to an asymmetrical federalism as an acknowledgment that constituted political communities that assent to the federation may vary in the nature of their relationship with the central state or to the wider political community.
Diversity, however, can mean many things to many interpreters. The fundamental question when it comes to the management of diversity in Canada is not "What is Canada's position on pluralism?" Rather, a commitment to diversity that accounts for its multilayered character would lead to something like the question "How does Canada accommodate demands by distinct national groupings that constitute the country to determine the boundaries of diversity within their respective polities?" In other words, the use of the institution of citizenship by the central state would not be aimed at creating pan-Canadian sentiments of belonging among citizens -in a universal sense. Rather, it would exhibit a stronger commitment and eff ort to manage the challenges associated with diverse modes of membership to the polity, in eff ect acknowledging its limits as an arbiter of citizenship status formally, through constitutional adjustments, and not by way of ad hoc arrangements. This implies an asymmetrical federal confi guration that would account for the complexity of the notion of equality in a multinational context as a basis for citizenship. Short of such measures, diversity in the Canadian context, defi ned by multiculturalism in a bilingual framework, the formal equality of the provinces, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is not postnational, but it fi lls in a national void in the "pre-political" sociocultural sense of the term.
A genuine commitment to postnational identity in Canada, which as a multinational state might seem a likely candidate, would lead to resistance to the top-down nation-building temptations of traditional nation states and allow for diverse political communities to work out the delicate balance between collective goods and individual rights themselves. In most liberal-democratic nation states, where citizenship has been traditionally congruent with the boundaries of national belonging, states have accepted pluralism as a sociological reality and have adapted by thinning out the requirements of membership. (This is an empirical development whose roots cannot be explored at length here.) In Canada, however, the institution of citizenship itself has recently been employed with the aim of making a single nation, a process whose peak in industrializing Europe was reached by states even before the development of Marshallian political, civil and social rights, when a vertical relationship between citizen and state was the norm and states simply set out to assimilate diverse identities into an elite-driven conception of nationality. This legacy does not bode well for a politics committ ed to diversity, regardless of what the rhetoric of multiculturalism and federalism suggest.
A POSTNATIONAL NATIONALISM IN QUEBEC?: NEW AVENUES TO EXPLORE
The parameters of national identity in Quebec must be assessed in the context of its minority status within Canada. As noted above, Quebec's status as a "nation" is not recognized formally in the Canadian Constitution. Quebec is considered to be a province, equal in status to the others, and individuals in Quebec are to enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms with those enjoyed by all other Canadians. Debates in Quebec concerning the defi ning characteristics of national identity have thus taken place in a sett ing in which it has to compete with a larger political community that delivers formal citizenship. National identity in Quebec faces the added burden of accounting for institutional and symbolic barriers that are externally imposed.
Moreover, the very legitimacy of the claim that Quebec is a "nation" is questioned by a signifi cant proportion of its population, due to the ambiguous nature of belonging in a hybrid political community. Debates surrounding the sociocultural versus "civic" or liberal character of national identity are easily dismissed by some, due to the fact that the national movement itself is articulated mostly from within one sociocultural grouping, the Francophone Quebecers. Quebec's national project is at times dismissed as reactionary, retrograde, and "ethnic." For example, Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (2003, 9) , discussing the tendency of contemporary liberal states to converge in their discourse about, and treatment of, the integration of immigrants, assume that Quebec is paying "lip service" to cultural pluralism while its nation-building eff orts are necessarily monocultural:
Consider the case of Quebec, the secessionist French-speaking province of Canada, which shows that in a world of liberal states even an extreme nation-building project must bow to the dominant rhetoric of cultural pluralism. Because of its nationbuilding (and thus monocultural) ambition, Quebec has always rejected the offi cial multiculturalism practiced since the early 1970s by the Canadian government.
Historically, nations and states have been coterminous, so it has been assumed that the larger "state" must be a refl ection of some "nation" that fi nds its clearest expression at the level of the central government, which in the fi nal analysis represents the institution that determines citizenship laws. Kenneth McRoberts (2003, iv) reminds us of this essential distinction between nation-states and "internal nations": "With the nation of the nation state, the citizenship laws of the state provide clear answers as to who is a member of the nation and who is not. The internal nation may not have a central institution to perform this task."
Others view Quebec's eff orts at defi ning the contours of citizenship as but another refl ection of att empts to broaden the discourse's normative impact given the widespread growth of identity claims and not as a competing centre for determining the very boundaries of citizenship. From this perspective Quebec's demands are interpreted as merely another set of claims on citizenship, similar to those of social movements more generally. The key assumption here is that the "challenge" posed by Quebec nationalism rests among other developments that "unsett le" nation-state citizenship, leaving litt le room for the conclusion that Quebec itself is involved in its very own debates about how to craft "nation-state" contours of membership. For example, in pointing out new developments in citizenship studies in Canada, Daiva Stasiulis (2002, 367) implicitly subsumes Quebec's societal project under the broad heading of an emerging "multiplicity of citizenships" in referring to "the creativity and culture-sett ing agendas of contemporary social movements (Aboriginal, Québécois, diasporic, queer, children)."
The very discourse of managing diversity in Canada through the institution of citizenship, from a Quebec nationalist perspective, is persistently coloured by the fact that the central institution of citizenship remains the preserve of the Canadian political community, and that Quebec identity is but an object to be managed in the larger canvas of diversity. This is the backdrop against which debates about managing diversity within Quebec, and reconciling it with Quebecers' conception of themselves as forming a nation, take place. Those debating the contours of Quebec's national identity, in contrast, seek to defi ne the political subject in the specifi c context of Quebec's political community. It is to this debate that we shall turn our att ention.
As is common for most claims about nations, absolute consensus with regard to the substance of shared identity in Quebec does not exist. The main problem with regard to the boundaries of Quebec's national identity relates to justifi cation of the idea that it has or can achieve nation-state status, or, more broadly stated, achieve some arrangement that recognizes a claim to Quebec sovereignty. The paradox is that the more "civic" or liberal the movement becomes, and the more it moves away from its "thick" sociocultural roots towards the trend of postnationalism, the more its justifi cations for sovereign status appear to be weakened (see Beauchemin 2002) . On the other hand, several authors have argued that it is precisely the move towards a sociopolitical conception of the nation, demarcated by the territory of Quebec, that demonstrates the political community's commitment to liberal democracy and its credentials as a societal culture without "internal restrictions." (Nonetheless, Kymlicka (1995) , for example, has a concern for liberalism that has led him to discount any societal culture that places illiberal internal restrictions on its citizens as illegitimate, and for him the Quebec model is very much in line with most liberal democracies in its commitment to liberal citizenship. Joseph Carens (2000, 107-39) agrees with this conclusion.
In the period since the "Quiet Revolution" of the 1960s interpretations and debates around Quebec's national identity have essentially developed in line with those of most societies in a period of late modernity. As shown in the excellent overview off ered by Maclure (2004) , during the era of Quebec state-building that coincided with the "Quiet Revolution," and was marked by an economic and cultural awakening of Francophone Quebecers, ideas and debates about Quebec's self-interpretation ranged from "melancholic nationalism" to anti-nationalist discourses, and each had its implications for political sovereignty. More recently, however, the foundations of collective consciousness have come to be debated in terms of their reconciliation with an increasingly pluralistic society. It is these latt er debates that are addressed here. The main concern has been with the burgeoning plurality of constituted identities and their impact on the project for political sovereignty. Indeed, national identity as the basis for political sovereignty and autonomy in Quebec was based on an ethnic conception of the nation in the years before the "Quiet Revolution," based on a particularistic defi nition of belonging that was incompatible with openness to cultural pluralism. Since that era, however, the defi ning features of the Quebec nation have evolved to incoprorate more civic and secular bases of what it means to be a Quebecker. Nationalism in Quebec has thus faced the task of being reconceptualized to accommodate the multiplicity of collective projects that compete, if indirectly, with particular conceptions of belonging based on the sociocultural nation. This is a familiar debate that in many respects has prompted scholars to point to the phenomenon of postnationalism as a marker of late modernity. In Quebec, however, the debate is rendered more complex because of the project for political sovereignty.
Some authors contend that there is an urgent need to move beyond sociocultural representations of the nation that requires openness to liberal and pluralist conceptions of collective consciousness. One such author, the political philosopher Michel Seymour (1999) , att empting to move the debate past its "civic versus ethnic" paradigm, proposes a sociopolitical conception of the national that demarcates it from absolute universal markers, while maintaining a commitment to late modern developments in Quebec society, accepting that no national imaginary can be legitimate if it excludes any portion of the population. For Seymour a nation that is purely civic can only be a nation that is already recognized as sovereign. The identity aspects of the national movement, while not necessarily resting on objective sociocultural markers, are, however, conceptualized as a project in the context of the quest to achieve sovereign status. This is the key marker, and debates cannot simply rest on an ethnic/civic continuum. If the nation is identifi ed as ethnic, then it excludes a good portion of society from membership, delegitimizing the movement altogether. If it is conceived as a civic collectivity, then what is the fundamental justifi cation for distinct sovereign status? It is a key component of Seymour's argument that forming a distinct political community that is shared with minority groups does not rule out the cultural, moral, and historical foundations of the majority linguistic grouping, yet at the same time it recognizes, through open political and social processes, the contributions of minority groups to shaping and reshaping, over time, the identity narratives of the project in progress.
Although reconciling the national with the postnational foundations of any society is a diffi cult theoretical task, the balance lies in recognizing that the sociopolitical aspects of the nationalist movement in Quebec must be interpreted in the context of its predicament as a societal culture that remains a work "in progress," and whose defi ning characteristics cannot be separated from its condition as minority nation that is free to achieve the status of a nation state. Debates about the postnationalist character of Quebec nationalism cannot fundamentally be grasped without reference to this paradox of self-interpretation.
The question of "belonging" in most liberal-democratic nation states is addressed through the central institution of citizenship. Debates surrounding the postnational markers of identity in such states, in an era of social pluralism and cultural diversity, do not have to contend with national diversity. Too conveniently perhaps, that they seek to accommodate diversity by stripping citizenship of its particular "national" bases and defi ne it along with universal entitlements that transcend national identity. In the Quebec case, by contrast, the nationalist movement itself, as a process of defi nition and redefi nition, rests upon interpretations of belonging that att empt to delineate it from a plurality of collective identities that are defi ned by a central institution of citizenship whose boundaries are set by the central Canadian state. In this sense managing internal diversity in Quebec can only be reconciled with the project for sovereign status if it assumes that the Quebec political community constitutes a "centre for convergence." Any conceptualization of a national model in Quebec cannot accept the universal premises of postnationalism, whether this takes the form of individual rights based on "personhood" or a cultural pluralist model that does not recognize the primacy of any majority sociocultural markers of identity, such as Canadian multiculturalism, without conceding that its project is no diff erent from that of any grouping that seeks diff erentiated recognition from the larger institution of citizenship.
The offi cial position in Quebec with regard to markers of belonging to the political community has been given form in two key government documents on the topic of Quebec citizenship (Conseil des relations interculturelles 1997 and Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration 2000). Without delving too deeply into the details of such policies, it suffi ces to say that Quebec's position on the construction of citizenship and, broadly speaking, on the contours of membership, diff erentiates itself from Canada's approach to diversity by stressing a "common public culture" and a pole for cultural convergence that is absent from offi cial Canadian multiculturalism. There is an emphasis on language, which is viewed as a bearer of culture but also as a common good that must be viewed as a rallying point for all residents of Quebec, delimiting the public space for democratic participation and debate. However, according to Danielle Juteau (2002, 441) , the very adoption of the language of citizenship signifi es a shift from a pluralist conception of the community to a conception of belonging that merges with nationality:
In spite of a shift from a cultural to a territorially based defi nition of the community, I argue that the citizenship presently developed is anchored in a homogenized notion of cultural belonging, as the Quebec state is att empting to defi ne a "universal" national identity that would subordinate all others. The national model of citizenship is preferred over the postnational, the republican over the pluralist, the undiff erentiated over the diff erentiated, at least when it comes to cultural identity.
Juteau contends that, while Quebec fl irted with a more unmitigated commitment to cultural pluralism in the early 1990s, the discourse under the Parti Québécois government that was in power from 1994 to 2003 was centred on citizenship, representing a shift to a more homogenous conception of the nation, which is contrary to international trends that are pushing liberal-democratic nation states towards multicultural rights and diff erentiated postnational identities.
Dimitrios Karmis (2004) adds to our understanding of identity in Quebec in the contemporary period, noting that there is a persistent strain within the "civic" strand of national identity that alternates between Jacobin-style republicanism and integrationist nationalism. For Karmis the notion that the construction of the nation in Quebec is based on ethnic defi nitions, along the lines of Trudeau's depiction of "old" Quebec, is a debate that has seen its last days. At present, in his view, the real tension lies within the "civic" camp. The past fi ft een years have seen alternating conceptions that lie somewhere in the middle between integrationism and republicanism. For integrative nationalists Jacobinism represents a defensive approach to identity. In its place Francophone Quebec is interpreted as a strong linguistic and cultural space, open to pluralist liberal-democratic citizenship as a shared good across the political community, which is open to the contribution of all cultures. Moreover, this model recognizes certain collective rights of national minorities, notably the Anglophone community and the Aboriginal peoples. The French language is valued as a bearer of a cultural heritage, but also for its public function of facilitating solidarity and deliberation, and as a point of convergence for various ethnocultural communities. The offi cial model of "interculturalism" emerged in the 1990s along these lines, as a model resting on the interchange of cultures rather than one based on their pillarization.
We concur with Juteau and Karmis that recent turns have moved the model closer to republicanism, particularly in the consultation document presented by the Parti Québécois government at the Forum national sur la citoyenneté et l'intégration (Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration 2000). This approach places relatively more emphasis on unity, consensus, and cohesion in its treatment of pluralism. We also contend that this distinction is of minimal consequence and represents a minor shift in emphasis as opposed to a wholesale redefi nition of belonging, as Juteau suggests. As highlighted above, Quebec nationalism's construction of boundaries must always account for a centre of convergence due to its status as a movement, in the process of defi nition within a larger citizenship regime.
One can argue that the move towards more republican conceptions of the Quebec model has been overstated. Quebec's att empt to balance unity and diversity nevertheless maintains a commitment to cultural pluralism within limits, and it cannot be lumped in with French or even American republicanism. In any case, both integrationist nationalism and more republican conceptions cannot, by their very logic of constituting a counter-movement, adopt unmitigated postnational markers of belonging. In the end Quebec does not simply face the question of diversity but must also address this question while justifying its very existence as a nation in a larger sociopolitical sett ing that does not formally recognize this fact. Postnational belonging comes aft er national belonging is taken for granted, and Quebec cannot simply skip this step. Quebec has demonstrated its commitment to the values of democracy, liberal justice, and cultural and national pluralism. It has abandoned exclusive ethnic markers of belonging both in offi cial national models and intellectual discourses. It cannot, however, undermine its claims by promoting the end of the nation form in the structuring of political sovereignty. That trend is reserved for nation states whose existence is not in question.
CONCLUSION
Diverse identities are indeed characteristic of modern liberal societies, and this has forced social scientists and political theorists to reconceptualize the institution of citizenship. However, reducing the Quebec national question to one among many other identities that make claims on the institution represents a political strategy by the Canadian state that does litt le to off er promise for the future. Canada must be postnational, in our view, not by way of universal and homogenous rights but by acknowledging the existence of several citizenship centres that are national in form to the extent that they are given the capacity to determine citizenship laws usually associated with central nation states. For us, Canada as a multinational federation is a worthwhile political project.
Quebec remains mired in debates about the character of its national sentiments. The proposal to off er a radically postnational basis of belonging is not a workable option. Given its present situation, even in the face of glaring obstacles, Quebec has demonstrated its commitment to cultural pluralism in a liberal-democratic sett ing. Short of a multinational federation, the ambiguous nature of belonging and self-understanding in Quebec, and the constant confusion with regard to its place in Canada, will persist, to the detriment of Quebec citizens vis-à-vis those of other political communities. In the end, even in a postnational age it is the nation form that lends legitimacy to liberal citizenship. Short of this equation, citizenship comes to be impoverished. It is through the recognition of a "nation" that social cohesion can be furthered, accountability can be strengthened, and the empowerment of citizens can be achieved.
The trend of postnationalism does not signal the end of sentiments of att achment to political communities on a more substantive level. There remains an element of national identifi cation in legitimate liberal-democratic conceptions of citizenship. The top-down "forging" of homogeneity through disassociated rights, however, can no longer take hold in a vacuum, as national minorities in the contemporary period simply will not allow this to take place. The process of generating a satisfactory model that accommodates diversity in a multinational democracy can only achieve the stature of a "procedural" basis of belonging or patriotism if the process itself has been adhered to by all parties. Moreover, the fi nal constitutional "product" that defi nes the basic laws of the country, maps the confi guration of political relations, acknowledges and recognizes national groupings, reforms the system of representation in order to accommodate asymmetrical relationships to the central state, and enshrines the right to self-defi nition for its constituent political communities will begin to achieve justice and stability that at once untangles the many complexities of diversity and provides the bases for unity.
The sociocultural foundations of this or that nation competing within a single territory is an old debate. The Quebec project is about allowing all cultures to participate in its construction for future generations. The culture is not a fi xture; it is in construction. The distinction in Quebec is that there is a strong will that this common public culture, its development, should not be hindered by the arbiters of central citizenship who give citizens of Quebec a "way out" of the project to strengthen pluralism and democracy in order to advance their own political agenda. Such an escape would be a shortcut, favouring ungenerous relations with Aboriginals, AngloQuebecers, and members of diverse recent immigrant communities that have made Quebec what it is today, a diverse nation committ ed to liberal democracy.
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